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Power versus prudence : why nations forgo nuclear weapons / T.V. Paul

By: Material type: TextTextLanguage: English Publication details: Québec, Canada : The Centre for Security and Foreign Policy Studies : The Teleglobe- Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies : McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000Edition: 1st editionDescription: viii, 227 páginas ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 0773520864 (cloth)
  • 0773520872 (paper)
Subject(s): Other classification:
  • 327.174 | P324p
Summary: With the end of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as a central issue in international security relations. While most existing works on nuclear proliferation deal with the question of nuclear acquisition, T.V. Paul explains why some states -- over 185 at present -- have decided to forswear nuclear weapons even when they have the technological capability or potential capability to develop them, and why some states already in possession of nuclear arms choose to dismantle them. Paul develops a prudential-realist model, arguing that a nation's national nuclear choices depend on specific regional security contexts: the non-great power stales most likely to forgo nuclear weapons are those in zones of low and moderate conflict, while nations likely to acquire such capability tend to be in zones of high conflict and engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. He demonstrates that the choice to forbear acquiring nuclear weapons is also a function of the extent of security interdependence that states experience with other states, both allies and adversaries.
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Incluye bibliografía e índice (páginas 158-227)

With the end of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as a central issue in international security relations. While most existing works on nuclear proliferation deal with the question of nuclear acquisition, T.V. Paul explains why some states -- over 185 at present -- have decided to forswear nuclear weapons even when they have the technological capability or potential capability to develop them, and why some states already in possession of nuclear arms choose to dismantle them. Paul develops a prudential-realist model, arguing that a nation's national nuclear choices depend on specific regional security contexts: the non-great power stales most likely to forgo nuclear weapons are those in zones of low and moderate conflict, while nations likely to acquire such capability tend to be in zones of high conflict and engaged in protracted conflicts and enduring rivalries. He demonstrates that the choice to forbear acquiring nuclear weapons is also a function of the extent of security interdependence that states experience with other states, both allies and adversaries.

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